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Abstract
A revisionist literature on the Great Chinese Famine has emerged in recent
years. These revisionists focus primarily on the question of agency. They
claim that that neither poor weather nor the excesses of local cadres can
explain the extent of mortality; rather, responsibility lies squarely with Mao
and the CCP leadership. Using county-level data on mortality, output, rainfall
and temperature for Sichuan province, I argue that this revisionist view is
unconvincing. Weather admittedly played only a minor role, and the zealotry
of the Party centre contributed significantly to the death toll. However, vari-
ations in mortality between Sichuan’s counties appear to have been essentially
random – suggesting that differences in local cadre responses to central gov-
ernment policy were decisive in determining the scale of famine.
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The history of the Great Chinese Famine of 1958–62 is being re-written. The con-
ventional wisdom contends that famine caused about 30 million “excess” deaths
across China and emphasizes the proximate causes of mortality: output decline,
excessive procurements and over-consumption.1 However, this interpretation has
been challenged in recent years on two counts. First, the revisionists (as I shall
call them) claim the death toll was much higher. Second, they focus less on the ques-
tion of proximate causes (“famine accounting”) and more on the issue of agency.2
In particular, they criticize what they call the official Party explanation – that poor
weather, withdrawn Soviet aid and local cadres caused famine – and argue instead
that responsibility for the famine lies primarily with Mao Zedong himself.
* I am grateful to Kerstin Lehr and Julia Strauss for their comments on an earlier version of this article, to
Tim Wright for alerting me to a number of sources, and to Kimberley Manning for allowing me an early
look at the manuscript version of Kimberley E. Manning and Felix Wemheuer, Eating Bitterness: New
Perspectives on China’s Great Leap Forward and Famine (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
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1 “Excess” meaning actual deaths minus the number of deaths that would have occurred if conditions had
been normal. For conventional estimates of mortality, see Basil Ashton, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza and
Robin Zeitz, “Famine in China, 1958–1961,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 10, No. 4
(1984), and Judith Banister, China’s Changing Population (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1987).
2 See especially Ralph Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), Thomas P. Bernstein, “Mao Zedong and the famine of 1959–1960,” The
China Quarterly, No. 186 (2006) pp. 421–45, and Kimberly Ems Manning and Felix Wemheuer
(eds.), Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China’s Great Leap Forward and Famine (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2011).
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In this article, I evaluate the revisionist view by considering the experience of
Sichuan province. The first section reviews the conventional wisdom and the revi-
sionist literature, and outlines my methodology. I then outline the scale and
geography of mortality in Sichuan, and the extent of the food availability decline.
The article then addresses the agency issues: what were the respective roles of bad
weather, central government and local cadres in the Sichuan famine?
Famine Perspectives, Old and New
Much of the traditional literature has been pre-occupied with what is best
described as famine accounting: measuring the respective roles played by output
decline, distributional failure and increased food demand. This explanation of the
famine goes as follows. First, the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) reduced grain
production from its 1958 peak of 198 million tonnes to a trough of 137 million
tonnes in 1961. The fall reflected reduced sown area, ill-advised changes in crop-
ping patterns (dense planting, double rice-cropping and attempts to grow wheat
on land previously used to store water during the winter), the diversion of labour
from farming to steel production, and poor weather. Although China became a
net grain importer, importing 4.5 million tonnes in 1961 compared with net
exports of 2.7 million tonnes in 1958, grain availability still declined from 296
kgs to 215 kgs per capita.3
However, and second, food availability decline (FAD) cannot explain the mor-
tality rise in 1958, when grain output per capita was actually higher than in 1957.
The 1958 crisis was precipitated instead by an unequal distribution of food
supplies.4 Unequal distribution, caused by excessive state grain procurements
and output over-reporting, also contributed to starvation during 1959–61,
when food was abundant in some areas yet desperately scarce elsewhere.5 The
third factor which contributed to the famine was a rise in per capita demand.
This reflected “over-consumption” in the communal canteens (where food was
freely available in 1958), and an increased demand caused by the frenzied
mobilization of the population to work on irrigation expansion and steel
3 Guojia Tongjiju (State Statistical Bureau) (SSB), Xin Zhongguo 50 nian nongye tongji ziliao (Materials
on 50 Years of Agriculture in New China) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2000), p. 37; SSB,
Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1983 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: Guojia tongji chubanshe,
1984), pp. 422, 438. Chinese data for this period are unreliable, because of pressure to exaggerate output
and the collapse of the statistical system; see Yue Wei, Dangdai Zhongguo de tongji shiye (China Today:
Statistics) (Beijing, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1990). However, the sharp decline in output and
rise in mortality is indisputable; we cannot be precise in analysing the famine, but we can still say much
about its scale and its causes.
4 Thus supporting Sen’s famous rejection of FAD as a general theory of famine. See Amartya Sen, “Food
and freedom,” World Development, Vol. 1, No. 6 (1989), pp. 769–81; Justin Yifu Lin and Dennis T.
Yang, “Food availability, entitlements and the Chinese famine of 1959–61,” Economic Journal, Vol.
110 (2000) pp. 136–58.
5 For procurements, see Thomas P. Bernstein, “Stalinism, famine and Chinese peasants,” in Theory and
Society, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1984), pp. 339–78; Robert F. Ash (ed.), Agricultural Development in China,
1949–1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Kenneth R. Walker, Food Grain Procurement
and Consumption in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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production.6 These three causal factors together explain the scale of mortality
during the Great Famine, although the precise contribution of each remains
indeterminate.7
The revisionist approach
The new revisionist literature focuses on more fundamental issues than famine
accounting. First, the revisionists aver that mortality was higher than the 30
million conventionally claimed. According to Cao, the famine claimed 32.5
million lives; Yang put the total at 36 million; Chang and Halliday computed
38 million deaths, and Dikötter claims over 45 million.8 Some of these estimates
are not very plausible.9 However, a settled mortality toll will never be agreed.
This is because of data problems (such as under-reporting of infant mortality,
widely revealed in the 1982 retrospective fertility survey), and because there is
no unambiguous way to calculate either “normal” deaths or the (hypothetical)
number of “normal” births: without the famine, there would have been more
births and therefore more infant deaths.10
The more significant contribution of the revisionists is to shift scholarly
attention to the question of agency. The conventional wisdom did not ignore
this question, and Mao-centred explanations of the famine are present in the
older literature.11 However, most scholars – especially economists – have been
6 For communal dining, see Dali Yang, Calamity and Reform in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1996), and Gene H. Chang and G. James Wen, “Communal dining and the
Chinese famine of 1958–61,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1997) pp.
1–34. For increased food demand, see Chris Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Han Dongping, “Farmers, Mao, and discontent in China,”
at http://www.monthlyreview.org/091214dongping.php. The over-consumption argument is controver-
sial because rationing replaced “free supply” in communal canteens before starvation appeared
(Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China, pp. 124–25). There is also little econometric sup-
port: see James Kai-sing Kung and Justin Yifu Lin, “The causes of China’s Great Leap famine,”
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2003), pp. 51–73.
7 See for example Peter Nolan, “The causation and prevention of famines: a critique of A.K. Sen,”
Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1–28, and Sen’s “Reply” in the same issue.
8 Cao Shuji, Da jihuang (The Great Famine) (Hong Kong: Time International, 2005), p. 282; Yang
Jisheng, Mubei (Tombstone) (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2008), p. 904; Jung Chang and Jon
Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005); Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great
Famine (London: Bloomsbury, 2010).
9 Dikötter’s estimate is not new, as he admits (Dikötter, Great Famine, p. 333). Rather, it is simply a
re-statement of the claim made by Chen Yizi and reported in Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts –
China’s Secret Famine (London: Murray 1996), pp. 271–72. Chen’s claim is suspect; he collected the
data whilst a member of an investigative team appointed by Zhao Ziyang in the early 1980s which
had the remit of discrediting the Maoist regime (and hence consolidating the political position of the
reformers). And some of Dikötter’s “new” provincial estimates have been in the public domain for
many years: for Sichuan, for example, see Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning, pp. 296–
97. More generally, Dikötter’s claim that the Chinese archives provide more reliable data on mortality
than published data is problematic. He asserts that archival reports can be trusted because “There was
no political advantage to be had from declaring extra deaths” (Dikötter, Great Famine, p. 332) but this
ignores how officials exaggerated deaths to evade or diminish state-imposed grain procurements.
10 For under-reporting, see Banister, Changing, pp. 233–35.
11 Bernstein (“Stalinism, famine and Chinese peasants”) has long adhered to this view.
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pre-occupied with famine accounting, and done little to probe the underlying
causes of the famine. The revisionists have been less reticent and their conclusions
are striking. For one thing, they reject the official verdict of the Maoist era
according to which the famine was seven-tenths natural and three-tenths man-
made (qifen tianzai sanfen renhuo 七分天灾三分人祸).12 In particular, they
argue that the 1958 famine cannot be explained by drought because there was
no output decline, the only channel through which weather has an influence.
And although revisionists agree that poor weather was a factor during 1959–
61, its impact was not severe enough to explain the scale of starvation. The
main cause of famine was therefore entitlement failure, not weather-induced
FAD.
However, the most striking revisionist claim is that the Party “centre” (central
and provincial governments) was primarily responsible for the catastrophe.13 The
famine, they argue, was no “tragedy of good intentions.” Rather, it was engin-
eered by a malevolent party-state and in particular by “China’s ultra-leftist
emperor, Mao Zedong, who was mainly responsible for relentlessly pushing left-
ism.”14 The radicalism of some provincial officials – such as Li Jingquan 李井泉
in Sichuan, Wu Zhipu 吴芝圃 in Henan and Zeng Xisheng 曾希圣 in Anhui –
also contributed to the scale of mortality.15 This coalition of Mao and radical
provincial leaders precipitated the famine by imposing collective farming during
1955–56. This deprived farmers of their land-based entitlement to food, and
enabled state-controlled rationing within communal canteens. Simultaneously,
collective farms allowed the party-state to guarantee urban food entitlements
by facilitating rural grain extraction. The Party centre was thus able to impose
its will on both local cadres and farmers. According to Thaxton: “Da Fo’s [the
village he studied] political history … re-affirms that Mao was the major causal
agent of the Great Leap calamity – not the local party cadres who were blamed
and scapegoated by Mao and allies at the center of the party.”16
12 The verdict was reversed after Mao’s death; see Han Dongping, “Farmers, Mao, and discontent in
China.”
13 The revisionist approach to the Chinese famine has been influenced by Scott’s description of how
authoritarian states cause famine by pursuing a “high modernist” agenda designed to imposed order
upon an “anarchic” countryside; see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998). In the Chinese context, it can be contrasted with Shue’s view that the
“reach” of the central Maoist state was rather limited; see Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
14 William A. Joseph, “A tragedy of good intentions: post-Mao views of the Great Leap Forward,”
Modern China, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1986), pp. 419–58; Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural
China, p. 325.
15 For the Henan famine, see Felix Wemheuer, “Dealing with responsibility for the Great Leap famine in
the People’s Republic of China,” The China Quarterly, No. 201 (2010), pp. 176–94, and Becker,Hungry
Ghosts. According to Chen, “Anhui’s Zeng was a blatant political radical who almost single-handedly
damaged Anhui” (Chen Yixin, “Under the same Maoist sky: accounting for death rate discrepancies in
Anhui and Jiangxi,” in Manning and Wemheuer, Eating Bitterness, p. 216). This was because Zeng
played a key role in promoting massive irrigation projects in Anhui and, because they absorbed a
large proportion of the farm workforce, these projects contributed significantly to the output decline.
16 Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China, p. 325.
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The revisionists acknowledge that the Party centre was no Leviathan. Where
county and village leaders resisted procurement burdens by under-reporting out-
put, by pre-emptive consumption (eating unripe crops) or by planting famine
crops (such as potatoes), the mortality toll was lower. Local resistance was not
always futile: it could and sometimes did vitiate central government policy.17
However, and this is a key revisionist point, such instances were rare. Almost
invariably the will of central and provincial governments prevailed over the resist-
ance of local cadres and farmers – who were nevertheless blamed in the early
1960s for the widespread starvation.
These revisionist claims are coherent and powerful. However, they raise meth-
odological issues. For one thing, the claims derive from a small number of village
surveys, which makes generalization difficult.18 For another, reliance on the
memory of village informants is problematic. The passage of time inevitably
adds colour to memories and, more importantly, memory is socially constructed:
villagers are telling what they believe to be true, but their revelations are con-
ditioned by a desire to preserve social “harmony” rather than to assign responsi-
bility.19 Accordingly, we must subject the revisionist claims to careful scrutiny
before accepting them. Such is the purpose of this article.
Methodology
In order to evaluate the revisionist claims, I start from the premise that bad weather
should not be dismissed a priori. It is true that weather-based explanations were dis-
counted even in the conventional wisdom. Kueh, whose work provides the most
detailed assessment of the impact of poor weather, concluded that it explained
barely 20 per cent of output decline in 1960 and 1961; the main culprit was a policy-
driven reduction in sown area.20 However, this analysis was based upon provincial
weather data. This is methodologically very dangerous. It has, for example, been
claimed that Sichuan experienced normal conditions during the famine years.
Although this is accurate if one considers average provincial rainfall, the average
is deeply misleading: in Sichuan’s case, the combination of flooding in the west
and drought in the east simply cancelled out to produce apparent normality.21
To avoid this problem we need a more disaggregated approach. I therefore utilize
previously unused data on rainfall and temperature collected by county weather
stations to assess the true impact of drought and flooding on mortality.
17 For examples cited by revisionists, see ibid. and Manning and Wemheuer, Eating Bitterness.
18 Provincial-level revisionist studies make little systematic use of the data and this limits their usefulness.
See for instance Chen, “Same sky,” in Manning and Wemheuer, Eating Bitterness.
19 Wemheuer (“Dealing with responsibility for the Great Leap famine,” p. 178) is aware of this problem
and claims that he is not assigning responsibility, but simply describing how memories of the famine
vary across different social groups. Nevertheless, it is clear that he assigns most of the blame to the
Party centre.
20 Y.Y. Kueh, Agricultural Instability in China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 207, 216, 224.
21 Daniel Houser, Barbara Sands and Erte Xiao, “Three parts natural, seven parts man-made,” 2005, at
http://repository.cmu.edu/sds/100/, p. 23.
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Second, the revisionist claim that local cadres were largely powerless to resist
central and provincial government demands can be tested. If the claim is correct,
there should be a pattern to the geography of mortality, reflecting the unequal –
but not random – treatment of localities in terms of procurement quotas. In par-
ticular, we would expect low mortality in localities where transport links were
poor and growing conditions were unfavourable because these counties were
not procurement targets: even the radicals did not expect big increases in output
in mountainous areas with poor soil and water shortages, Conversely, we would
expect to observe high mortality rates where transport links were good and agri-
cultural productivity high because a powerful provincial and central government
would have been able to impose high procurements on such counties, increasing
death rates. However, if mortality rates were often driven by local cadre behav-
iour, we would expect a random pattern of mortality. Any counties dominated by
“radical” cadres would have experienced very high mortality rates, while some
prosperous and well-located counties would have emerged from the Leap with
low numbers of famine deaths as “moderate” local cadres evaded and ignored
the centre’s policies.
Accordingly, we can evaluate the revisionist claims using county-level data on
mortality, grain output and weather to identify whether the geography of mor-
tality was random, or followed a pattern.22 A national analysis of county data
would be ideal, but it is impracticable because of the volume of data required.
In any case, spatial variations in famine mortality within Chinese provinces
were typically so large that the province serves as an adequate test of the hypoth-
esis that central government policy was decisive. Sichuan is an obvious choice
here because it was the Chinese province with the highest absolute death toll.23
I therefore address these issues using county-level data drawn from the various
County Records (Xianzhi 县志) and weather data collected at more than 20
Sichuan weather stations. I begin by outlining the scale and pattern of mortality.
The Sichuan Famine, 1958–196224
The famine in Sichuan started earlier (in 1958) than elsewhere: the all-China
crude death rate (CDR) in 1958 was marginally higher than in 1957, but in
Sichuan it rose from 12 to 25 per thousand. The Sichuan famine was also
more severe than almost anywhere else in China.25 Not only was the average
22 I focus on output and mortality data for the counties because that is the lowest administrative level at
which systematic analysis is possible.
23 By “Sichuan” I mean the province of the early 1960s, which comprised the cities of Chengdu,
Chongqing and Zigong, and 15 special districts (zhuanqu, abbreviated as district throughout this article).
For simplicity, “Chengdu district” includes Chengdu city and the counties of Wenjiang district,
“Chongqing district” includes Chongqing city, the counties of Baxian, Qijiang and Changshou, and
the counties of Jiangjin district, and “Yibin district” includes Zigong.
24 Note that the death rate fell back to its 1957 level in 1962; for this reason, I focus on 1958–61.
25 For the literature on Sichuan, see Cao Shuji, The Great Famine, pp. 193–215 and Yang Jisheng,
Tombstone, pp. 161–228; Cao Shuji, “1958–1962 nian Sichuan sheng renkou siwang yanjiu”
(“Research on mortality in Sichuan province 1958–1962”), Zhongguo renkou kexue (Population
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CDR for 1958–61 (39 per thousand) well above the national average of 17 per
thousand but also the peak rate in Sichuan (54 per thousand in 1960) was higher
than in every Chinese province except Anhui (69 per thousand).26 Moreover,
although the rate was higher in Anhui, the overall death toll was greater in
Sichuan.27
The proximate determinants of mortality28
The fall in per capita grain availability in the early 1960s played a key role in
Sichuan’s famine. The decline was sharp: rural availability fell from around 197
kgs per head in 1957 to a low of 133 kgs in 1959 (Table 1).29 Some of this 64 kg
decline reflected higher procurements. The net rate peaked at 38 per cent in 1959,
driven by “exports” to other provinces and in-kind debt repayments to the
USSR. Extraction was facilitated by the completion of the railway between Baoji
宝鸡 in Shaanxi province and Chengdu, which linked Sichuan to the national net-
work in September 1956. However, even if procurements had remained at their 1957
rate, rural grain availability in 1959 would still have been no higher than 155 kgs per
head. As subsistence required about 200 kgs of processed grain, an allowance of only
155 kgs would have meant starvation.30 We can therefore state unequivocally that
the decline in per capita grain output – which contributed 42 kgs of the 64 kgs
fall between 1957 and 1959 – was the main proximate cause of FAD.31
This calculation of the FAD, and the contribution of procurements to that
decline, is crude. It exaggerates the decline in food supplies because it neglects
footnote continued
Science in China), No. 1 (2004) pp. 57–67); Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning, pp. 281–
334; Stephen Endicott, Red Earth (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 51–67. Ding Shu, “1960 nian qian-
hou Sichuan sheng de fei zhengchang siwang” (“Abnormal deaths in Sichuan before and after 1960”),
2009, at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk.asap; Wang Dongyu (Dong Fu), “Dayuejin shiqi Sichuan
sheng dajihuang de teshu” (“Specific causes of the Great Famine in Sichuan”), 2009, at http://www.
chinayj.net/StubArticle.asp?issue=090106&=104; Wang Dongyu, “Maimiao erqing cai huahuang –
Chuanxi dayuejin jishi” (“Ripening wheat seedlings and golden cauliflower – a record of the Great
Leap Forward in western Sichuan”), 2000, at http://www.yhcw.net/famine/. For the political back-
ground, see David S.G. Goodman, Centre and Province in the People’s Republic of China
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
26 SSB, Quanguo gesheng zizhiqu zhixiashi lishi tongji ziliao huibian (Collection of Historical Statistical
Materials on China’s Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Centrally-Administered Cities) (Beijing:
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1990), pp. 2, 690 (LSTJ 1990).
27 9.4 million compared with 6.3 million according to Cao Shuji, The Great Famine, p. 282.
28 The mortality crisis began in Sichuan in 1958, even though there was no apparent decline in per capita
grain output (see Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning, pp. 309–13). However, because of
space constraints, I concentrate here on 1959–61, when most deaths occurred.
29 Urban grain availability was higher but mortality nevertheless still rose significantly.
30 This includes an allowance for animal feed and seed, and assumes the consumption of additional
calories from meat, vegetables and fruit (see Ash, Agricultural Development, p. 141)
31 Of the 103 counties for which I have data for 1957 and for 1959–61, only eight (all located in mountai-
nous western Sichuan) reported a rise in average per capita output whereas 95 reported a decline. For
the sample, the average decline in per capita output was 28%, similar to the figure for the entire province
(32%).
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stock depletion and higher husking rates during the famine years.32 Moreover, it
underestimates the impact of procurements by ignoring the indirect effects on
output: villagers could often meet quotas only by selling seed grain, thus compro-
mising the harvest in the following year. Yet despite this imprecision, it is certain
that Sichuan experienced FAD and that this decline made a significant contri-
bution to the famine. This suggests that Sichuan’s experience differed from
Thaxton’s Da Fo village (Henan), where there was seemingly no decline in per
capita output.
Spatial variations in mortality
Although most Sichuan counties experienced higher mortality during 1959–61,
there were massive variations in crude death rates (Figure 1).33 Mortality rates
were low in three places. The first was in Sichuan’s cities. The urban CDR aver-
aged a (comparatively) modest 21 per thousand during 1958–61: in both
Chengdu and Chongqing districts, the mortality rate in the urban core was
well below that in the outlying counties.34 Second, mortality was low in
Table 1: Grain Output, Procurements and Mortality in Sichuan
Net grain procurement
rate (%)
Grain output
(m tonnes)
Grain
availability per
head (kgs)
Crude death
rate(per 1,000)
Rural Urban Rural Urban
1955 23 15.70 194 371 9 10
1956 23 17.23 209 296 11 9
1957 26 17.07 197 238 12 11
1958 26 17.89 209 406 26 15
1959 36 12.66 133 350 49 21
1960 27 10.70 135 197 54 24
1961 20 9.55 134 217 30 23
1962 19 11.49 160 358 15 14
Notes:
“Availability” means grain which could be used directly and indirectly (feed, food processing etc.). It is net of husking, resales, and
exports to the USSR and other provinces but excludes stock changes.
Sources:
Zhonggong Sichuan sheng wei yanjiushi (Research Unit of the Sichuan Committee of the CCP), Sichuan sheng qing(Conditions in
Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1984) pp. 559, 571; Sichuan tongjiju (Sichuan Statistical Bureau), Sichuan tongji nian-
jian 1990 (Sichuan Statistical Yearbook 1990) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1990) (SCTJNJ 1990), pp. 57–58.
32 Villagers across Sichuan responded to famine by consuming brown rather than white rice, and by repla-
cing wheat and rice with calorie-dense tubers. A kilogramme of unhusked grain thus translated into
more calories in 1961 than in 1956–57.
33 I have used data on CDRs for 123 Sichuan counties to construct Figure 1, and the district median as a
proxy where data are missing. CDRs provide an imprecise measure of the demographic impact of fam-
ine, but population growth rates between 1957 and 1964, and survival rates by age and county at the
time of the 1982 Census, confirm the spatial patterns shown.
34 Sichuan tongjiju (Sichuan Statistical Bureau), Sichuan tongji nianjian 1990 (Sichuan Statistical Yearbook
1990) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1990) (SCTJNJ 1990), p. 58; Chongqing tongjiju
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Himalayan Aba阿坝 and Ganzi甘孜 districts, suggesting that Sichuan’s Tibetan
minority suffered less than the Han majority; official estimates of the CDR for
the Tibetan minority show that it peaked at 18 per thousand in 1961, well
below the provincial peak of 54 per thousand in 1960.35 Third, mortality was gen-
erally lower in northern Sichuan and the central Sichuan basin.
By contrast, the highest district level of mortality was recorded in Fuling涪陵,
where the CDR for 1958–61 averaged 64 per thousand. Even this understates the
intensity of the famine. The death rate actually exceeded 100 in six of the eleven
counties in one year or other in Fuling. Death rates were also high in Ya’an雅安
and Neijiang 内江 districts (47 and 48 per thousand in the respective median
Figure 1: Crude Death Rates by County in Sichuan, 1958–1961 (annual average,
per 1,000)
Notes:
The (named) districts, and the county boundaries, are those of 1964. The famine death rate in the median Sichuan county was 36
per thousand.
Sources:
Various Local Records (full details are available from the author); Neijiang diqu renkou zhi (Population Records of Neijiang District)
(Beijing: Zhongguo renmin chubanshe, 1993); Yang Jisheng, Mubei (Tombstone) (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2008), pp. 532–33.
Where the sources conflict, I have used the higher rate.
footnote continued
(Chongqing Statistical Bureau) Chongqing jianshe sishinian (40 Years of Building Chongqing) (Beijing:
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1989); Chengdu tongjiju (Chengdu Statistical Bureau), Chengdu tongji
nianjian (Chengdu Statistical Yearbook 1999), at http://www.chdstats.gov.cn/.
35 Sichuan sheng renkou pucha bangongshi (Sichuan Population Census Office), Sichuan Zangzu renkou
(The Tibetan Population of Sichuan) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994), p. 172.
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counties). Moreover, starvation was commonplace even close to the provincial
capital: the CDR in the median county of Chengdu district was 45 per thousand
for 1958–61. But even these horrendous district-level medians only hint at the
exceptionally high CDRs recorded in some Sichuan counties. It exceeded 100
per thousand in 23 counties in one or other year, and surpassed 150 per thousand
in five.36 In the three counties of Dayi大邑, Xiushan秀山 and Yingjing荥经, the
rate exceeded 100 in successive years. Unsurprisingly, it was a Fuling county
(Shizhu 石柱) which recorded the highest three-year CDR (109 per thousand)
reported in Sichuan for 1959–61.37
One of the key tasks, then, in assessing the Sichuan famine is to explain these
spatial variations in mortality. It is of course important to explain why the aver-
age provincial crude death rate rose from 12 per thousand in 1957 to 54 per thou-
sand in 1960. However, we also need a theory which explains the massive local
variation in death rates. Why was it that the CDR in Pi 郫 county soared
from 12 per thousand in 1956 to 175 per thousand in 1960, whereas in nearby
Shuangliu 双流, which started from the same mortality rate in 1956, it never
exceeded 37 per thousand?
Bad Weather and the Sichuan Famine
In order to explain both the overall mortality rise and the spatial variations in
mortality across Sichuan, I start by assessing the impact of poor weather. Was
mortality extreme in (for example) Pi county because it was the victim of poor
weather?
Although weather has sometimes been dismissed as a propaganda-based expla-
nation of the Great Famine, there is nothing inherently implausible in the notion
that bad weather played a key role in the Sichuan catastrophe. Chinese geogra-
phers estimate that there is 70 per cent chance of drought – the main threat –
every ten years in the area around Fuling and Mianyang 绵阳, and about 30
per cent elsewhere in the Sichuan basin.38 Moreover, there is some evidence,
admittedly not entirely consistent, that drought caused famine in 1937.39 A
weather-based explanation of the Sichuan famine therefore cannot be ruled out
a priori.
36 In the counties of Pixian (175 per 1,000 in 1960), Shizhu (168 in 1960), Rongxian (165 in 1960), Fengdu
(163 in 1960) and Yingjing (151 in 1959); see Yang Jisheng, Tombstone, p. 533 for Rongxian and Shizhu.
Other rates from Xianzhi (County Records) (XZ): Pi XZ (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1989),
p. 131; Yingjing XZ (Chongqing: Xinan shifan daxue chubanshe, 1998), pp. 111–13; Fengdu XZ
(Chengdu: Sichuan kexue jishu chubanshe, 1991), pp. 94–95.
37 Yang Jisheng, Tombstone, p. 533.
38 Zhongguo kexueyuan Chengdu dili yanjiusuo (Chengdu Geographical Research Institute, Chinese
Academy of Science), Sichuan nongye dili (An Agricultural Geography of Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan
renmin chubanshe, 1980).
39 Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning, pp. 282–91. The infant mortality rate in 1937 was see-
mingly higher than in 1959 in Shifang county on the Chengdu plain; see William R. Lavely, “The rural
Chinese fertility transition,” Population Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1984) pp. 365–84.
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Accordingly, I proceed to assess the effects of bad weather by employing the
figures assembled in two datasets covering respectively 160 and 205 weather
stations across China. By using the data collected at a weather station in each
Sichuan district, we can establish the pattern of rainfall.40 As far as 1958–61 is
concerned, it is true that rainfall at the median Sichuan weather station was
just 4 per cent higher than the 1951–80 average, a modest variation. However,
this provincial median is misleading. First, rainfall is only one dimension of
weather; we must supplement it with temperature data. Second, the provincial
median averages out extremes of flooding and drought: flooding in Mianyang
and Chengdu districts – rainfall there was over 30 per cent above average for
the four years – cancelled out drought in (for example) Chongqing, where rainfall
was 20 per cent below average. Third, the four-year median obscures sharp
year-on-year fluctuations, and acute summer drought. In Neijiang, for example,
rainfall was 39 per cent below normal in 1958. In Fuling, the shortfall was 367
mms over the whole of 1959 and rainfall was barely 44 per cent of average in
July–August. In 1960, the Fuling rainfall deficit was less than in 1959 and
1961. However, this disguises the 47-day drought between 17 July and 1
September (the worst of the Maoist era): only 34 mms of rain fell, as against
245 mms in a normal year.
To capture the impact on output of these regional, annual and seasonal vari-
ations, I estimate a production function incorporating an aridity index. I assume
that the grain production function was Cobb-Douglas in form, and that the main
determinants of output were grain sown area, the size of the rural labour force,
the input of fertilizer, a time trend and the degree of aridity. When the weather
is normal, the aridity index takes a value of one and its natural log is zero. In
order to calculate the aridity index, I use monthly data on rainfall and tempera-
ture for five Sichuan weather stations during May–August, the main growing
period for rice.41 The provincial average is based on the sum of the deviations
at the five stations. I also assume that only drought conditions seriously affect
output because of the dominance of rice production across Sichuan; only if
rice had been submerged for a long period would output losses have been signifi-
cant, and this was a rare event in well-drained paddy fields.42
My calculations suggest that poor weather played a modest role in causing the
Sichuan famine. The coefficient on the aridity index obtained from the
40 Rainfall and temperature data come from the 205 and 160 station national sets at http://dss.ucar.edu/
datasets/ds578.5/data/ and http://dss.ucar.edu/datasets/ds578.1/data/ respectively. Some of Sichuan’s
County Records (e.g. Shehong, Pixian and Anyue) also report rainfall and temperature data.
41 These five stations (Pengshui, Nanchong, Chengdu, Yibin and Bazhong) together cover the key grain-
producing parts of the province. I ignore western Sichuan, where grain production and population den-
sity were low. For aridity indices, see Bernard Oury, “Allowing for weather in crop production model
building,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1965), pp. 270–83. Here I use the de Martonne
index, but the conclusions are insensitive to the index used.
42 The late 1950s and early 1960s were extraordinarily wet across the western Sichuan basin (including
Chengdu). However, the County Records make little mention of damage caused by flooding; drought
was evidently the main problem.
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production function is 0.33. This suggests that drought reduced grain output
(relative to 1957) by about 5 per cent in 1959, 4 per cent in 1960 and 4 per
cent in 1961. Drought thus explains about 20 per cent of the output decline in
1959, 11 per cent in 1960 and nine per cent in 1961. These are modest contri-
butions and, given that poor weather can only cause famine via output decline
and that output decline was only one cause of famine,43 it follows that poor
weather cannot have been the main causal factor. More precisely, 42 kgs of
the 66 kg decline in food availability in 1959 (compared with 1957) can be
explained in terms of output decline, and only 20 per cent of that 42 kg output
decline can be explained by the weather. In other words, only 8 kgs (12 per
cent) of the Sichuan FAD in 1959 – when drought was most intense – can be
explained by poor weather.
These econometric procedures are crude. There are potential problems associ-
ated with colinearity and endogeneity,44 the data are not fully reliable, and we
really need separate production functions for each Sichuan agricultural region
because of differences in the composition of grain output. Additionally, it
would be better to calculate an aridity index using data for every Sichuan weather
stations (not just five) and for every month (and not merely the summer).
Nevertheless, the approach appears relatively robust. Experimentation with
different forms of the production function does not significantly alter the con-
clusions. Moreover, district-level evidence suggests little correlation between
weather fluctuations and output. For example, output in the districts of Yibin
宜宾, Neijiang and Daxian 达县 was over 40 per cent lower in 1961 than in
1957, yet rainfall was virtually normal. Chongqing and Neijiang (as previously
noted) were hard-hit by drought in 1958, yet per capita output actually rose.
Still, we cannot ignore the contribution of weather in parts of Sichuan. In
Fuling district, for example, in the summer of 1961, rainfall was barely 10 per
cent of normal and the fall in rice production – the crop most affected by summer
drought – was particularly severe. Across Sichuan, rice output in 1961 was 50 per
cent below its 1958 level, but in Dianjiang垫江 and Fuling counties, production
was barely 20 per cent of the 1958 peak.45 But drought was most damaging in
Fuling in 1959, when rainfall was 50 per cent of the total required. The pro-
duction function approach discussed earlier suggests that this 1959 drought
reduced grain output by 14 per cent compared with 1957. As the total fall in out-
put in 1959 was 24 per cent, poor weather was evidently the most important
factor in reducing output in that year.
43 The 1958 mortality crisis was not due to output decline, and both high procurements and increased food
demand contributed significantly to mortality during 1959–61.
44 For example, I proxy the supply of fertilizer using the pig stock (chemical fertilizer use was negligible in
the late 1950s). The pig stock was certainly a determinant of grain output (more pigs meant more fer-
tilizer). However, causality also ran in reverse: increased grain output meant more pig feed.
45 Dianjiang XZ, p. 338; Fuling XZ, p. 379.
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Agents of Famine: The Provincial Government and Local Cadres
Fuling’s experience, however, was the exception. For Sichuan taken as a whole,
human agency, rather than poor weather, was the key causal factor. What, how-
ever, of the respective parts played by the provincial government and local cadres
in the Sichuan catastrophe? Should the Party centre be blamed, as the revisionists
assert, or does much of the responsibility lie with local cadres?
The role of the provincial government
The “radicalism” of Li Jingquan, the provincial Party secretary, undoubtedly
played a deadly role.46 Of course the policies pursued in Sichuan originated
with the central government, but Li’s radical interpretation of them undeniably
exacerbated the famine.
Li was a radical well before the Leap. Although the pace of collectivization
seemed slow in the mid-1950s, this was because Li had promoted the creation
of large lower stage co-operatives in 1955. These proved very inefficient, so
much so that they had to be dissolved before higher stage co-operatives (that
is, collectives) could be established. Li also pushed for high rates of investment,
accepted high procurement quotas and was an ardent advocate of the 12 Year
Agricultural Plan in the mid-1950s, which together created the “supply crisis”
of 1956–57, an eerie foretaste of the Leap.47
Li Jingquan’s radicalism was not extinguished by the failures of the mid-1950s.
Instead, Sichuan was one of China’s most radical provinces during the Leap. For
example, Li was keen for Sichuan to increase its net grain exports (to the USSR
and other provinces). In consequence, and despite being a modest per capita
grain producer, Sichuan exported more grain than any other province in every
year between 1957 and 1961, and was a net exporter even at the height of famine
in 1959–60.48 At a local level, the burden was often crippling. For example,
Shifang 什邡 county on the Chengdu plain exported a staggering 44 million
kgs of its grain output of 95 million kgs in 1959.49
A second instance of Li’s radicalism was the high investment rate, especially in
1959 when it reached 35 per cent. Although this was lower than the national aver-
age (44 per cent), the burden in terms of “lost” consumption was much higher in
a poor province like Sichuan.50 Third, Li Jingquan promoted rapid rural indus-
trialization. This drew much labour out of farming and into the cities, such that
Sichuan’s rural labour force fell by 17 per cent during 1957–58, whereas it rose by
46 Li escaped much of the official blame for the Sichuan catastrophe but many scholars are less charitable;
see Ding Shu, “Abnormal deaths in Sichuan,” and Wang Dongyu, “Specific causes of the Great Famine
in Sichuan.”
47 Goodman, Centre and Province in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 50–51.
48 Ash, Agricultural Development, p. 130.
49 Shifang XZ (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1988), pp. 10–20, 18–55. Of this, 30 million kgs went
to the USSR.
50 Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning, pp. 322–24.
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4 per cent nationally.51 With many farmers temporarily engaged far from home
in iron and steel production – for example, 30,000 of the farmers resident in
Renshou 仁寿 county had been sent to Hongya 洪雅, some 80 kms to the west
– the residual farm labour force was not large enough to collect the harvest.52
For Sichuan as a whole, 10 per cent of the (notional) 1958 harvest allegedly
rotted in the fields.53 Fourth, Sichuan created communes unusually quickly. By
the end of September 1958, 97 per cent of households were in communes.54 By
contrast, Guizhou accomplished this only in February 1959. Canteens were
also introduced earlier (by October 1958, 95 per cent of households were eating
there),55 closed late, and provided a larger proportion of “free” food than else-
where.56 Additionally, Sichuan introduced brigade-level accounting, despite the
prevalence of team-level accounting in other provinces and Mao’s own opposi-
tion.57 Finally, Sichuan pioneered changes in cropping patterns. The province
moved quickly to eliminate winter-flooded fields (dongshuitian 冬水田)58 –
whereby paddy fields were flooded during the winter as a hedge against drought
the following spring – so that winter wheat acreage could be expanded.59
Simultaneously, sown area was cut: Sichuan’s grain-sown area fell by 15 per
cent in 1959 compared with the national fall of only 9 per cent.60 These cuts in
sown area, along with falling yields, were central to declining grain output in
1959–61.
Spatial variation and the role of local cadres
Nevertheless, neither the influence of central government nor the radicalism of Li
Jingquan explains the marked spatial variation in mortality rates. Consider the
experience of Chengdu district. In such a topographically similar area, weather
variations between counties were comparatively small. Moreover, Chengdu’s
counties were similar in economic geography, economic structure and per capita
51 LSTJ 1990, pp. 3, 691
52 The scale and impact of migration during the famine has been little explored. However, it appears that
the controls on migration imposed by the Party Centre helped to intensify the scale of mortality. By pre-
venting able-bodied workers from returning to their home villages, the harvest was lower than it would
otherwise have been, especially in 1958. Moreover, the rationing of food supplies via communal can-
teens made it hard for “outsiders” to migrate to communes with higher per capita food supplies:
such outsiders had no entitlement to food and therefore migration offered little panacea.
53 Yang Chao, Dangdai Zhongguo de Sichuan (Contemporary China: Sichuan) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui
kexue chubanshe, 1990), p. 93fn.
54 Ibid. p. 91.
55 Ibid. p. 91.
56 Goodman, Centre and Province in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 150, 151, 236.
57 Ibid., pp. 138, 144, 154, 158.
58 Dongshuitian were prevalent in Sichuan; e.g. they comprised 70% of paddy fields across Fuling district in
the mid-1950s; see Ye.A. Afanas’yeskiy, Szechwan (New York: JPRS Translation No. 15308, 1962),
p. 301.
59 The abolition of dongshuitian contributed greatly to famine because, until the irrigation schemes begun
in the 1950s were completed, farmers had no recourse to alternative water supplies in the event of severe
droughts.
60 SSB, Materials on 50 Years of Agriculture, p. 34; SCTJNJ 1990, p. 130.
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output: located on the fertile Chengdu plain and within close reach of the new
Chengdu–Baoji railway, these were Sichuan’s most prosperous counties.
Unsurprisingly, they were singled out for grain procurements and industrial
development by the Party centre. Yet despite their structural and locational simi-
larities, the variation in mortality rates amongst these counties in 1960 is striking
(Figure 2).
The evidence suggests that differences in local cadre responses to central and
provincial government initiatives explain these mortality variations. Where
cadres meekly accepted high procurement quotas, cuts in sown area and orders
to invest heavily in industry, mortality soared.61 It was no accident that the
death rate (175 per thousand in 1960) was especially high in Chengdu’s Pi county.
The compliers of the County Records blame local radicalism for this, and no won-
der. Its cadres were radicalized by Mao’s visit on 16 March 1958 and by the pres-
ence of Deng Xiaoping – a radical in those days – on 18 March. Consequently,
the county established Sichuan’s first commune on 19 August 1958. Moreover,
Pi’s cadres also accepted high procurements, which rose from 48 million kgs of
unhusked grain in 1956 to 135 million in 1959, over 50 per cent of output.62
Yet the mere fact of a visit by Mao does not explain the intensity of famine: it
was the response of local cadres that was critical. Neighbouring Guan灌 county,
now Du river dam (Dujiangyan 都江堰) city, was also visited by Mao, this time
on 21 March 1958. The policies adopted in the county adhered closely to the
Party centre line. Local cadres increased grain procurements from 37 million
kgs in 1957 to 50 million in 1959, and doubled the non-agricultural population
between 1957 and 1959 to develop industry and widen the area irrigated by the
celebrated Dujiangyan. Even so, Guan’s cadres were far less zealous than their
neighbours in Pi county. Even at its peak in 1960, Guan’s crude death rate of
50 per thousand was less than the provincial average and far below the 175 per
thousand in Pi county.63 It was a similar story in Shuangliu (where peak mor-
tality rate was only 37 per thousand) and in Chongqing county (27 per thousand).
It seems, then, that local cadre responses, not differential economic treatment
by the Party centre, best explain mortality variations around Chengdu. The evi-
dence for other parts of Sichuan supports this contention. As shown above,
Fuling district was hard-hit by drought, and mortality rates were well above
the provincial norm. Yet drought cannot explain why modest 1960 mortality
rates in Ba 巴, Changshou 长寿 and Pengshui 彭水 counties of 31, 41 and 55
per thousand respectively co-existed alongside the very high rates of 168 and
61 Although we lack proper evidence, the response of local cadres towards the policies of the Party centre in
respect of migration was also crucial. In counties where local cadres limited the exodus of able-bodied
workers to work on industrial projects outside the county boundaries, the 1958 harvest would have been
higher. Conversely, cadres willing to accept large numbers of in-migrants ran the risk of pushing up
mortality by exhausting local food supplies. In other words, the Party centre was responsible for impos-
ing the institutions of collective farming and communal dining, but the interpretation and implemen-
tation of these policies by local cadres was critical in determining local mortality rates.
62 Pi XZ, pp. 19, 131, 253–54, 490, 492.
63 Guan XZ (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1991), pp. 121–22, 130, 460.
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163 per thousand suffered by neighbouring Shizhu and Fengdu 丰都 respect-
ively.64 The whole region suffered drought, not just one or two counties.
Consider also Ya’an district, west of Chengdu. The peak death rate in the median
Ya’an county was 67 per thousand, but this again disguises local variations. In
Shimian 石绵, the death rate was below 33 – yet in nearby Yingjing, it reached
151 per thousand in 1959 and 112 per thousand in 1960.65 Ya’an district was a
procurement target: most of its counties were accessible by road from
Chengdu. However, it was the radicalism of Yingjing’s two Party secretaries
that caused starvation. 1958 saw both the early creation of communal canteens
(the process was completed by September) and a massive campaign to promote
steel production.66 The resultant labour shortages ensured that much of the
Figure 2: Crude Death Rates on the Chengdu Plain by County, 1960 (deaths per
1,000)
Notes:
I use the Sichuan urban average (see SCTJNJ 1990, p. 58) for Chengdu city. There are no data for Pengxian, Xinfan and Xindu.
Sources:
As for Figure 1.
64 Fuling XZ (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1995), p. 233; Dianjiang XZ (Chengdu: Sichuan
renmin chubanshe, 1993), p. 131; Ba XZ (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1994), p. 656;
Changshou XZ (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1997), p. 178.
65 Yingjing XZ, p. 112.
66 Yu Xiguang at http://www.yhcw.net/famine/reports/10018.htm.
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harvest was not collected. Worst followed in 1959 when grain procurement rose
from 4 to 10 millions kgs; with 1959 output down by about 50 per cent because of
labour shortages, this meant that the (gross) procurement burden rose from 14 to
a colossal 80 per cent. In 1960, gross procurements increased still further, reach-
ing 11 million kgs – more than the grain harvest for that year (9 million tonnes) –
making widespread starvation almost inevitable.67
This contention that variations in mortality patterns across Sichuan were lar-
gely random is supported by the evidence in Figure 1. There is little to suggest
that mortality was concentrated along the main transport arteries (the Baoji–
Chengdu railway and the central riverine zone), though that is what one would
expect if central government procurement policy was decisive. Moreover, pros-
perity offered no security against starvation: Pixian’s population starved, yet
Chongqing’s was barely affected even though both were amongst Sichuan’s
most prosperous counties. But poverty offered no inoculation against famine
either: Fuling’s Shizhu and Fengdu counties were amongst the poorest in the
entire Sichuan basin and yet mortality was extreme in both.68
This conclusion that mortality patterns lack any obvious pattern is supported
by formal econometrics. To test the conclusion, I assume that changes in mor-
tality between 1956–57 and 1958–61 were a function of three factors: the extent
of the output decline, the level of per capita output in 1956–57, and location. If
mortality was driven by central government policy, we would expect the highest
mortality rates in counties which were procurement targets – that is, counties
which produced a surplus (as measured by per capita output), and which were
accessible (so that the surplus could be extracted and exported to other cities
and provinces). In other words, the revisionist hypothesis implies that the
regression coefficient on both per capita output in 1956–57 and location should
be positive.69 As it turns out, both location and per capita output in 1956–57 are
statistically significant in the sample of 84 Sichuan counties for which I have data.
However, the results are not robust. Rather, they depend upon the inclusion of
five poor counties located on the Himalayan plateau, which produced little
grain (because of geographical disadvantage) and which did not even establish
communes until the 1970s.70 Once these five anomalous counties are excluded
67 Yingjing XZ, pp. 281, 453. Rao Qing, Party secretary in 1960, was later sentenced to eight years in a
labour camp for his failures.
68 Ó Gráda is right that the famine generally hit hardest in provinces which were poor, such as Sichuan,
Anhui and Henan; see Cormac ó Gráda, Famine (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp.
252–54. However, my results show little correlation between output per head and mortality at a sub-
provincial level in Sichuan.
69 In this set-up, I use average output for 1956–57 to smooth output anomalies in 1957. I employ adjusted
grain output data because reported output provides a misleading impression of food supplies by taking
no account of differences in output composition or husking rates; raw grain data thus exaggerate the
level of per capita output in (say) the rice-producing counties of the Chengdu plain relative to the
corn and potato-producing counties of the central Sichuan basin. Peripheral counties are those located
outside the central riverine zone and away from the provincial railway network.
70 Land reform was not attempted here until the late 1950s because these counties were so poor, and
because of separatist sentiment amongst China’s Tibetan population in the early and mid-1950s.
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from the sample, neither the coefficient on per capita output nor that on location
is statistically significant.
In short, the geography of mortality across Sichuan was determined primarily
by the attitude of local cadres and (to a lesser extent) the weather. Mortality rates
in counties like Pi, Yingjing and Shizhu were exceptionally high because their
cadres were over-zealous in their interpretation of the policies pursued during
the Leap – not because they were targeted by central or provincial government.
Conclusion
The Sichuan evidence does not support the revisionist contention that the scale of
the famine was caused primarily by the Party centre. Although the famine was
man-made, revisionist emphasis on the role played by central and provincial gov-
ernments seems over-stated. Differences in the attitudes of provincial leaders cer-
tainly help to explain variations in mortality across provinces.71 But local leaders
were as culpable as the “malevolent” provincial and central committee cadres
who constituted the Party centre. As I have argued, the geography of mortality
was essentially random across Sichuan: it is hard to detect the guiding hand of a
radical provincial leader in any of this. Mortality rates were not systematically
higher in those counties which might have been singled out – by their productivity
and transport links – by a radical provincial leader for penal procurement quotas.
On the contrary. The variation in mortality between counties with very similar
economic structures and located within the same district is so great as to defy sys-
tematic explanation. It can be plausibly explained only by differences in local cadre
behaviour.
Of course the Party centre created the context for starvation by launching the
Leap. After all, the famine affected the entire Sichuan basin: the mortality rate in
1959–61 exceeded that of 1956–57 in almost every county in central and eastern
Sichuan. Only the Himalayan counties of western Sichuan escaped. This shows
that there was a general macroeconomic policy failure, and local cadres cannot
be blamed for that. Moreover, the famine was primarily man-made. Of course
some districts were hard-hit by drought: over 50 per cent of the output decline
in Fuling in 1959 was due to summer drought. But Fuling was the exception –
and even there the 1959 drought was devastating only because of the premature
assault on the dongshuitian, the traditional system of irrigation. The Sichuan fam-
ine was not, therefore, primarily a natural disaster.
Yet in the genesis of this man-made catastrophe, the contribution of local
cadres was far more important than the revisionists would have us believe.72
The worst excesses of central government policy during the Leap could be
71 A point emphasized in Chen, “Same sky,” pp. 197–225.
72 The evidence for Sichuan during the famine thus supports Shue’s (The Reach of the State, p. 131) view
that “far from serving as robotic handmaidens of central domination, these stubborn, savy, and often
cynical local officials came to constitute a formidable obstacle to real and effective central penetration
and control on the ground.”
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resisted, and the variation in death rates across the province shows that, in many
parts of Sichuan, they were resisted by local leaders. These local cadres were not
merely passive participants in the drama which unfolded across Sichuan in the
late 1950s and early 1960s. Rather, in those parts of the province where star-
vation was extreme, local cadres were as much agents as victims. Attempts to
shift the blame for the Great Famine from local leaders to the Party centre
and to Mao himself therefore do not square with the evidence. The Party centre
was in no sense as powerful as the revisionists claim: the starvation that occurred
during the Leap depended as much upon the willing participation of a myriad of
“ordinary” local cadres as it did upon the orders of Mao Zedong.
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